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PROBABILISTIC INFERENCE IN CAPUCHINS 
Abstract 20 
The ability to reason about probabilities has ecological relevance for many species. Recent research has 21 
shown that both preverbal infants and non-human great apes can make predictions about single-item 22 
samples randomly drawn from populations by reasoning about proportions. To further explore the 23 
evolutionary origins of this ability, we conducted the first investigation of probabilistic inference in a 24 
monkey species (capuchins; Sapajus spp.). Across four experiments, capuchins (N = 19) were presented 25 
with two populations of food items that differed in their relative distribution of preferred and non-26 
preferred items, such that one population was more likely to yield a preferred item. In each trial, 27 
capuchins had to select between hidden single-item samples randomly drawn from each population. In 28 
Experiment 1each population was homogeneous so reasoning about proportions was not required; 29 
Experiments 2-3 replicated previous probabilistic reasoning research with infants and apes; and 30 
Experiment 4 was a novel condition untested in other species, providing an important extension to 31 
previous work. Results revealed that at least some capuchins were able to make probabilistic inferences 32 
via reasoning about proportions as opposed to simpler quantity heuristics. Performance was relatively 33 
poor in Experiment 4, so the possibility remains that capuchins may use quantity-based heuristics in some 34 
situations, though further work is required to confirm this. Interestingly, performance was not at ceiling in 35 
Experiment 1, which did not involve reasoning about proportions, but did involve sampling. This suggests 36 
that the sampling task posed demands in addition to reasoning about proportions, possibly related to 37 
inhibitory control, working memory, and/or knowledge of object permanence. 38 
 39 
Keywords: capuchin; intuitive statistics; numerical cognition; primate cognition; probabilistic inference; 40 
proportional reasoning   41 
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Introduction 42 
Numerical competence is ecologically relevant in many contexts. It enables efficient foraging, 43 
reduces predation risk, increases the likelihood of success in group conflict situations, and makes it 44 
possible to keep track of group members and prey items (e.g. Addessi et al. 2008; Beran et al. 2011; 45 
Schmitt and Fischer, 2011; Wilson et al. 2001). Extensive research has revealed that basic numerical 46 
abilities are evolutionarily ancient: a wide range of nonhuman animals (hereafter animals) including 47 
several species of mammals, birds, fish and insects are capable of using representations of quantity to 48 
guide their behaviour (see Reznikova and Ryabko 2011; and Vallortigara 2014 for recent reviews).  49 
One specific aspect of numerical cognition that has been much less studied in animals is the 50 
ability to reason about probabilities, or make probabilistic inferences. The key distinction between this 51 
ability and other types of numerical competence is that reasoning about probabilities involves reasoning 52 
about relative quantities, or proportions (e.g. in a population consisting of two types of item, the quantity 53 
of one type of item relative to the total quantity of both types of item) as opposed to simple comparisons 54 
of absolute quantities (Bryant and Nunes 2012). In some situations in the natural environment the ability 55 
to make accurate absolute quantity judgements is not sufficient for informing decision-making; being able 56 
to use proportion judgements is also required (Rugani et al. 2015). For example, to gain access to the 57 
largest quantity of food, an individual needs to consider both the amount of food in alternative locations, 58 
and the number of other individuals feeding at these different locations (Rugani et al. 2015). Relative 59 
judgments are also important outside of the number domain: there is a growing literature on inequity 60 
aversion in animals – the sensitivity to one’s own effort and payoff relative to another individual’s (e.g. 61 
Brosnan and de Waal 2003; Brosnan et al. 2005; Cronin and Snowden 2008; Range et al. 2009).   62 
In humans, traditional theory suggests that the ability to make probabilistic inferences does not 63 
develop until around seven years of age (Piaget and Inhelder 1975). However, recent research using 64 
violation of expectation looking-time paradigms (based on the premise that infants look longer at 65 
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surprising or unexpected events) and action-based choice tasks has revealed that human infants are 66 
capable of basic reasoning about probabilities (Denison and Xu 2010; 2014; Teglas et al. 2007; 2011; Xu 67 
and Garcia 2008). Denison and Xu (2010) also demonstrated that infants are capable of drawing 68 
inferences from populations to randomly-drawn single-item samples to guide their decision-making in a 69 
choice task. When presented with two visible populations that differed in their distributions of preferred 70 
to non-preferred items (4:1 vs. 1:4), infants accurately predicted which of two single-item samples drawn 71 
from the two populations was more likely to consist of a preferred item, indicated by crawling towards the 72 
location of that sample.  73 
In all of these studies however, absolute quantity was confounded with proportion, because in 74 
each case the highest proportion object in a population was also the most numerous. For example, 75 
suppose a person has a stronger preference for pink than green objects. When comparing a population 76 
containing 40 pink and 10 green objects against a population of 10 pink and 40 green objects, one could 77 
compare the two proportions (4:1 vs. 1:4) or one could use a shortcut and simply compare the quantity of 78 
pink objects only across populations (40 vs. 10). Though correct use of either strategy is likely to result in 79 
the same behaviour in this case (i.e. approach the sample from the 40 pink and 10 green population), only 80 
the latter strategy reflects accurate probabilistic reasoning, as using a strategy of relying on numerators 81 
and ignoring denominators will lead to errors in many cases. Indeed, ignoring denominators is a strategy 82 
that children have been shown to use in some mathematics problems until middle childhood, and evidence 83 
of proportional reasoning is required for a population to be credited with true probabilistic reasoning 84 
(Falk et al. 2012; Bryant & Nunes, 2012).  85 
To address this issue, Denison and Xu (2014) ran a series of experiments to determine whether 86 
infants are using this type of quantity-based heuristic or comparing proportions when making inferences. 87 
Infants were presented with two visible populations that differed in their distributions of preferred to non-88 
preferred items, as in Denison and Xu (2010). However in this series of experiments infants could not 89 
succeed by basing their selection on the greater quantity of preferred items, because the quantity was the 90 
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same in both populations, or because quantity was pitted directly against proportion (i.e. the population 91 
containing the greater quantity of preferred items contained a lower proportion of preferred items). Their 92 
results provided strong evidence that 12-month-old infants are capable of using proportions to predict 93 
which of two single-item samples randomly drawn from two populations is more likely to consist of a 94 
preferred (as opposed to non-preferred) item.  95 
In addition to investigating the developmental origins of probabilistic reasoning in Western 96 
children, recent research has begun to explore this capacity cross-culturally, and has revealed that 97 
preliterate and prenumerate human cultures are able to make implicit probabilistic inferences, suggesting 98 
that this ability may be universal within our own species (Fontanari et al. 2014). There is also a growing 99 
body of literature investigating the evolutionary origins of intuitive statistics; that is, the extent to which 100 
any animals might share intuitive statistical abilities with humans. Rakoczy et al. (2014) ran a study based 101 
on the tasks developed by Denison and Xu (2010; 2014) with all four species of nonhuman great ape 102 
(hereafter ape). They found that apes share with human infants the ability to draw inferences from 103 
populations to randomly drawn single-item samples. Several control conditions ruled out the possibility 104 
that apes were solving the tasks by using simple quantity heuristics or subtle experimenter-given cues, as 105 
opposed to reasoning about proportions (Rakoczy et al. 2014). Further evidence that apes are capable of 106 
making basic probabilistic inferences comes from a study by Hanus and Call (2014), which investigated 107 
chimpanzees’ ability to use probabilistic reasoning to find a food item hidden under one of several cups 108 
on one of two trays. Performance in the task was correlated with the probability ratio between the two 109 
trays (a signature property of the analogue magnitude system (AMS); a mechanism for quantification of 110 
arbitrarily large magnitudes that is shared by many species, e.g. Jordan and Brannon 2006), so the greater 111 
the discrepancy between the two trays in terms of probability of finding the reward, the more likely 112 
chimpanzees were to select a cup from the more probable tray.  113 
 These recent findings suggest that the capacity for probabilistic inference is not uniquely human; 114 
rather it is shared by our closest relatives, the great apes. However, the question remains of how 115 
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evolutionarily ancient and therefore how widespread in the animal kingdom the ability may be. Recent 116 
research has demonstrated that two individuals of an Old World monkey species (rhesus macaques; 117 
Macaca mulata; Drucker et al. 2016), as well as day-old chicks (Gallus gallus; Rugani et al. 2016) 118 
possess the pre-requisite ability of distinguishing between proportions of discrete items; however, these 119 
studies did not address whether these individuals were able to make inferences on the basis of 120 
probabilities. Probabilistic inference goes one step beyond the ability to compare proportions, because the 121 
subject also needs to understand the sampling part of the procedure; that is, they need to make inferences 122 
about the probable identity of items drawn from populations, based on the distribution of items in those 123 
populations. The aim of the present set of experiments was to investigate whether capuchin monkeys 124 
(Sapajus spp.), like human infants and apes, are able to use proportional reasoning to make probabilistic 125 
inferences about single-item samples randomly drawn from populations. To our knowledge this is the first 126 
study to investigate probabilistic inference in a monkey species. Capuchins are interesting from a 127 
comparative perspective, because as a New World primate they share a more evolutionarily ancient 128 
common ancestor with humans than the apes (and the Old World monkeys), the two lineages having 129 
diverged over 30 million years ago (Fragaszy et al 2004). Previous research on numerical cognition in 130 
capuchins has generally demonstrated that they have abilities comparable to those exhibited by apes. Like 131 
apes, capuchins have displayed an ordinal concept of quantity (Judge et al. 2005); they are able to judge 132 
relative quantity of sets of objects and amounts of substance when they are presented as discrete sets (e.g. 133 
Addessi et al. 2008) and to some extent when they are presented sequentially (e.g. dropped into a cup one 134 
item at a time; Evans et al. 2009; VanMarle et al. 2006); and they can make accurate numerosity 135 
judgements when presented with moving dots of two different colours on a screen (Beran et al. 2011). 136 
There is also some evidence that capuchins may be sensitive to inequity between themselves and another 137 
individual (Brosnan and de Waal 2003), which also involves making relative judgements.  We therefore 138 
predicted that capuchins should also perform comparably with apes in proportional reasoning tasks.  139 
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We presented capuchins with a series of experiments based on those used in recent studies with 140 
infants (Denison and Xu 2010; 2014), young children (Girotto et al. 2016) and apes (Rakoczy et al. 2014), 141 
as well as a novel experimental condition that has not previously been presented to any species 142 
(Experiment 4). In all of the experiments, subjects were presented with two populations of food items in 143 
transparent jars. The two populations differed in terms of their distribution of two types of food item: one 144 
preferred and one non-preferred; so that in each case one population was ‘favourable’, in terms of the 145 
probability of a randomly drawn single-item sample consisting of a preferred item. Across all experiments 146 
we refer to the favourable population as Jar A, and the unfavourable population as Jar B (though jar 147 
placement is always counterbalanced on the left and right). In each trial, the experimenter randomly drew 148 
a single-item sample from each jar, kept them hidden in her hands, and allowed the subject to choose 149 
between the two samples. To select the sample most likely to consist of the preferred item, subjects had to 150 
distinguish between the two populations and infer the relative probability that each of the samples would 151 
consist of a preferred item. They then had to use this information to guide their decision-making 152 
behaviour when selecting one of the samples. We also extended the recent work with infants and apes by 153 
including a novel experimental condition (Experiment 4) that directly addressed the possibility that 154 
subjects could potentially succeed at the task by using a quantity heuristic based on avoiding the 155 
population containing the greater quantity of non-preferred items, by presenting populations that were 156 
both unlikely to yield a preferred item, but one was more unlikely than the other.  157 
Methods 158 
Subjects 159 
Nineteen capuchins (Sapajus spp.) participated in this study (see Table 1). The subjects were 160 
housed at the ‘Living Links to Human Evolution’ Research Centre at the Royal Zoological Society of 161 
Scotland, Edinburgh Zoo, U.K. There were 6 females and 13 males aged between 2 and 16 years (mean = 162 
6.4 years). The subjects did not have any previous experience with numerical or quantity based cognitive 163 
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tests. The subjects were housed in two groups (East and West; referring to the geographical location of 164 
the enclosures at the zoo), and both groups cohabited with common squirrel monkeys (Saimiri sciureus). 165 
Each group was housed in an indoor enclosure (189 m
3
) with access to a ~900 m
2
 outdoor enclosure, both 166 
of which had ample climbing substrates. For further details of housing and husbandry see Leonardi et al. 167 
(2010).  168 
* Table 1 about here * 169 
Study design  170 
Prior to participating in any experiments, all subjects participated in food preference trials, to 171 
establish their preference between a peanut and a monkey pellet. Subsequently, four experiments were 172 
carried out (Experiments 1 – 4). Experiment 1 was designed to familiarise subjects with the single-item 173 
sampling procedure, and establish their baseline performance in this task with two populations each 174 
consisting of just one type of item (100% preferred vs. 100% non-preferred; Figure 1a). Therefore, all 175 
subjects participated in Experiment 1 first. 176 
* Figure 1 about here * 177 
 178 
Experiment 1 consisted of four sessions of six trials (24 trials in total): in sessions 1 – 3 the 179 
experimenter’s arms were straight (i.e. the hand containing the item from Jar A was next to Jar A when 180 
the subject made their selection; Figure 2a), and in session 4 the experimenter crossed her arms before 181 
allowing the subject to make their selection (i.e. the hand containing the item from Jar A was next to Jar B 182 
when the subject made their selection; Figure 2b).  183 
* Figure 2 about here * 184 
 185 
This design was used in the previous work with infants and apes thus we did the same to allow maximal 186 
comparability across taxa. Including the arms-crossed session also allowed us to rule out the possibility 187 
that capuchins were simply basing their selection on the location of the favourable population (e.g. 188 
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choosing the hand next to the jar where they could see the most preferred items, in which case we would 189 
expect performance to be below chance in the arms-crossed session), or actually considering the samples 190 
drawn from the populations. This is important because choosing on the basis of the probable identity of 191 
the sample is an important way in which probabilistic inference differs from the pre-requisite ability of 192 
being able to compare the proportions of items in populations. Without these arms-crossed trials, it would 193 
be difficult to know whether the participants are truly reaching toward the correct sample or are instead 194 
perhaps reaching toward the jar with the higher proportion of preferred items. 195 
Experiments 2 – 4 were designed to investigate the ability of the subjects to make inferences 196 
about random samples drawn from mixed populations (Figure 1b – d), and to rule out the possibility that 197 
subjects could solve this type of problem using heuristic rules based on the absolute quantities of the 198 
items, rather than the relative proportions of the preferred to non-preferred items. To control for potential 199 
learning effects across experiments, subjects completed Experiments 2 – 4 in a random order. 200 
Experiments 2 – 4 each consisted of three sessions of six trials (18 trials in total). Within each session, all 201 
trials were either presented with the experimenter’s arms straight (Figure 1a) or crossed (Figure 1b). 202 
Within each experiment subjects were randomly assigned to either arms straight or arms crossed 203 
presentation, and across Experiments 2 – 4 subjects either experienced two experiments with arms 204 
straight and one experiment with arms crossed, or vice versa (see Table S1 in Online Resource 1). To 205 
control for side preferences, in all experiments, the side on which the jar containing the favourable 206 
population (Jar A) was presented was pseudorandomised within each session of six trials, with the 207 
constraints that it appeared three times on each side, and not on the same side in more than two 208 
consecutive trials.  209 
Procedure and materials 210 
Subjects were tested individually in a test cubicle (49.5 cm × 52.1 cm × 51.4 cm) with a Plexiglas 211 
window that had two 5 cm diameter holes 26 cm apart that subjects could reach their arms out of to make 212 
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selections. Subjects received one session of six trials per session and up to two sessions per day (with 213 
approximately three hours between the morning and afternoon sessions). Populations of peanuts and 214 
monkey pellets (Figure 1) were presented to subjects in two transparent glass jars on a wheeling trolley. 215 
In all experiments, several measures were taken to avoid possible cueing via the experimenter’s 216 
body posture, facial expression or gaze direction (i.e. a “Clever Hans effect”). The general method for 217 
drawing samples from populations and presenting them to subjects followed Rakoczy et al. (2014). At the 218 
start of each trial the experimenter placed her closed fists on the table behind the two jars. She then 219 
simultaneously shook both jars whilst looking at the subject to draw its attention to them. The 220 
experimenter then closed her eyes and tilted her head upwards to convey random drawing of samples, 221 
drew a single item from each jar simultaneously, and kept them concealed from the subject in her closed 222 
fists (in fact the required items were already surreptitiously held in the experimenter’s hands prior to 223 
shaking the jars and “extracting” the sample). Following Rakoczy et al. (2014), in Experiments 2 and 3 224 
the item “drawn” from each population was the majority item. Because in Experiment 4 the non-preferred 225 
item was in the majority in both populations, we manipulated the samples to match the probabilities of the 226 
populations (see procedure section of Experiment 4 for details).  The experimenter then extended her 227 
arms simultaneously to present her fists containing the concealed items centred at the two evenly spaced 228 
holes in the cubicle window, at a fixed equal distance from the window. She then held this position until 229 
the subject made their choice. When presenting items with arms crossed (Figure 2b), the experimenter 230 
always crossed her right arm over her left arm. During presentation of the items the experimenter fixed 231 
her gaze in the centre of the two holes in the window and maintained a symmetrical posture and neutral 232 
expression (as in e.g. Albiach-Serrano and Call 2014). This prevented the experimenter from 233 
inadvertently gazing at either option or making eye contact with the subject (it was not possible for the 234 
experimenter to have her eyes closed or avert her gaze while the subject made their selection for safety 235 
reasons). The subject was allowed to select one fist by touching it and the experimenter then opened that 236 
hand and allowed the subject to take that item for immediate consumption. Subjects were not praised for 237 
    11 
PROBABILISTIC INFERENCE IN CAPUCHINS 
selecting either item. The experimental procedure can be seen in the supplementary videos (Online 238 
Resources 2, 5, 7 and 8). Any deviations from this general procedure are described under the relevant 239 
experiment section below. 240 
Data coding and analysis 241 
All sessions were videotaped. For each trial we scored whether the subject selected the hand 242 
containing the item from Jar A (favourable population) or the hand containing the item from Jar B 243 
unfavourable population). To select a hand the subject had to touch it with one of their hands; just 244 
reaching towards one of the experimenter’s hands did not constitute making a selection. We also scored 245 
the side at which the hand that was selected by the subject was located (left or right window hole, from 246 
the subject’s perspective). A second coder scored a random 25% of the recorded sessions to assess inter-247 
observer reliability. Cohen’s kappa was 0.99 for whether the subject selected the experimenter’s hand 248 
containing the item from Jar A or Jar B (99% agreement between coders). Disagreements were resolved 249 
through discussion. Our main dependent variable was the average proportion of trials correct. We also 250 
examined Trial 1 performance for each experiment, as well as Trial 1 performance for each session of 251 
each experiment. The reason for this latter analysis was to increase power, given that we had fewer 252 
subjects than the previous work with infants and apes.  All statistical tests were two-tailed, and the 253 
significance level of alpha was 0.05 unless otherwise stated. 254 
Preference trials 255 
Prior to introducing the populations of items in jars, food preference testing was carried out. The 256 
aim of this was to establish each subject’s preference between a peanut and a similar-sized monkey pellet 257 
piece. 258 
Subjects 259 
 All 19 subjects participated in the preference trials. 260 
    12 
PROBABILISTIC INFERENCE IN CAPUCHINS 
Procedure 261 
Subjects were presented with a single session of 10 preference trials. In each trial, the 262 
experimenter presented the two items simultaneously in her open palms at the left and right holes in the 263 
cubicle window and the subject was allowed to take one item. The side on which the peanut appeared (left 264 
vs. right window hole) was pseudorandomised, with the constraints that it appeared five times on each 265 
side, and it could not appear on the same side in more than two consecutive trials. 266 
Results and discussion 267 
In the preference test all 19 subjects selected the peanut in 10/10 trials. This suggests that all of 268 
the subjects had a strong preference for peanuts over monkey pellets, and were thus highly motivated to 269 
maximise intake of peanuts. It also demonstrated that subjects were able to visually discriminate between 270 
the two food items.  271 
Experiment 1: Inferences from homogeneous populations to samples (baseline condition) 272 
The aim of Experiment 1 was to familiarise subjects to the sampling procedure, and to establish 273 
their baseline performance in the task when each of the populations consisted of a single type of item 274 
(100% preferred vs. 100% non-preferred), i.e. when no proportional reasoning was necessary. 275 
Subjects 276 
 All 19 subjects participated in Experiment 1 (see Table 1). 277 
Apparatus and procedure 278 
The jars depicted in Figure 1a were used. Jar A contained 300 peanuts (preferred) and Jar B 279 
contained 300 pellets (non-preferred); i.e. the populations were not mixed and each consisted of one type 280 
of item. 281 
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There were four sessions of six trials (24 trials in total). In session 1 (arms straight; Figure 2a) 282 
items were presented to the subject in the experimenter’s closed fists, and once the subject had selected a 283 
hand the experimenter opened that hand and the subject could take the item of food from their palm. The 284 
item concealed in the unselected hand was not revealed to the subject. Because performance was not as 285 
good as we might have expected in this initial session we made some modifications to this procedure. In 286 
sessions 2 and 3 (arms straight) the procedure was the same, except that the experimenter kept the items 287 
concealed between her fingers and thumb instead of in her closed fist, so they were still not visible to the 288 
capuchin, but the presentation was more similar to the way in which food items are normally handed to 289 
the subjects (see video in Online Resource 2; all video captions are in Online Resource 9). In addition, 290 
after the subject had made their selection, the experimenter revealed what item was in the unselected 291 
hand. In session 4 (arms crossed) the procedure was the same as in sessions 2 and 3, except that after 292 
drawing an item from each of the jars, the experimenter crossed her arms over, so that the hand containing 293 
the item from Jar A (a peanut) was next to Jar B (containing 100% pellets) when the subject made their 294 
selection. 295 
Results and discussion 296 
Subjects selected the hand containing the item from Jar A (peanut:pellet ratio of 300:0) in 61.0% 297 
of trials (Figure 3), significantly more than expected by chance (one-sample t-test: t(18) = 3.713, P = 298 
0.002,  d = 0.1.750)
 1
.  299 
* Figure 3 about here * 300 
 301 
A repeated measures ANOVA, with session (1 – 4) as a within-subjects factor found no main effect of 302 
session on performance (F(3,54) = 1.619, P = 0.196, partial η2 = 0.183), suggesting that subjects did not 303 
learn to solve the task over the course of the experiment (performance across trials is shown in Fig. S1a of 304 
                                                          
1
 All analyses reported in this manuscript were also run using non-parametric tests (Friedman's tests, Wilcoxon 
signed-rank tests; Mann-Whitney U tests) and produced similar p values in all experiments; see Online Resource 3 
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Online Resource 4), and also that the method of presenting the items (closed fists vs. finger/thumb) did 305 
not influence performance. Therefore in Experiments 2 – 4 we used the closed fist method, to maximise 306 
comparability with the previous ape study (Rakoczy et al. 2014). Trial 1 performance was significantly 307 
better than chance, with 16/19 subjects (84.2%) selecting the hand containing the item from Jar A 308 
(binomial test: P < 0.001), which further supports an absence of learning across trials. Pooling Trial 1 309 
performance for each of the four sessions of Experiment 1 also revealed above-chance performance 310 
(mean = 3.1 trials correct out of 4; one-sample t-test: t(18) = 5.144 , P < 0.001 ,  d = 2.425). Performance 311 
did not differ significantly between trials in which the experimenter’s arms were straight (61.4% correct) 312 
and those in which they were crossed (58.8%; t(36) = 0.465, P = 0.645,  d = 0.013), suggesting that 313 
subjects were equally able to solve the task regardless of whether the sample was on the same side as the 314 
jar it was drawn from, or on the opposite side, and were not simply reaching towards the jar containing 315 
the greater quantity of preferred items.  316 
Performance in Experiment 1 was poorer than expected overall, given the subjects’ strong 317 
motivation to obtain peanuts rather than pellets as evidenced by the preference trials. Many subjects 318 
exhibited significant side-biases (though there were no 100% side-biased individuals, unlike in 319 
Experiments 2 – 4; see Table S1 in Online Resource 1), compared with in the preference trials where 320 
none of the subjects were side-biased. Interestingly, recent evidence suggests that making inferences 321 
about samples drawn from homogeneous populations can be a non-trivial task, even for 3-year-old 322 
children (Girotto et al. 2016). Given that this task did not require subjects to reason about probabilities, 323 
this suggests that the sampling procedure, i.e. the experimenter randomly drawing a single item from each 324 
population and keeping it hidden in their hand while subjects make their selection poses additional 325 
demands (cognitive and/or non-cognitive) that impair performance. This requires knowledge of object 326 
permanence (to understand that there were items in the experimenter’s hands that were currently out of 327 
sight); short-term memory (for which jar each sample was drawn from); and inhibitory control (to prevent 328 
impulsive reaching to a side for which the subject has an inherent preference). While apes have not been 329 
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tested in a comparable baseline task, there is some evidence that apes outperform capuchins in tests of 330 
object permanence, short-term memory and inhibitory control (Amici et al. 2008; 2010), and we return to 331 
this in the General Discussion. 332 
Experiment 2: Inferences from heterogeneous populations to samples 333 
The aim of Experiment 2 was to investigate the ability of capuchins to make an inference about 334 
which of two single-item samples drawn from two populations differing in their distributions of preferred 335 
to non-preferred items is more likely to consist of a preferred item. 336 
Subjects 337 
Seventeen subjects participated in Experiment 2 (see Table 1). Two subjects did not participate 338 
due to a lack of motivation to come into the testing cubicles for sufficient sessions to complete the 339 
experiment.  340 
Apparatus and procedure 341 
The jars depicted in Fig. 1b were used. Both jars contained the same total number of items (300) 342 
but Jar A contained a 4:1 distribution of peanuts to pellets, and Jar B contained a 1:4 distribution of 343 
peanuts to pellets. The samples drawn always consisted of a peanut from Jar A and a pellet from Jar B 344 
(the majority item, as in Rakoczy et al. 2014). Items were presented to the subject in closed fists and once 345 
they had taken the selected item the alternative item was revealed to them (see video in Online Resource 346 
5). There were three sessions of six trials (18 trials in total). 347 
Results and discussion 348 
Of the seventeen subjects that participated in Experiment 2, seven exhibited a 100% side bias 349 
(they chose the sample on the same side in all 18 trials), suggesting that their behaviour was independent 350 
of the populations in the jars, and thus uninformative with regards to our experimental question. 351 
    16 
PROBABILISTIC INFERENCE IN CAPUCHINS 
Therefore, we excluded these subjects from our analyses; an approach that has previously been used with 352 
young children (e.g. Austin et al. 2014), capuchins (e.g. de Waal et al. 2008; Schrauf et al. 2008), and 353 
other animal species (e.g. Tauzin et al. 2015) in two-alternative forced choice tasks. We followed this 354 
procedure for the remainder of the experiments reported in this paper (results of analyses with 100% side-355 
biased individuals included are available in Online Resource 6). 356 
The ten subjects that were not 100% side-biased selected the hand containing the item from Jar A 357 
(peanut:pellet ratio of 240:60) in 63.9% of trials (Figure 3); significantly more than expected by chance 358 
(one-sample t-test: t(9) = 3.049, P = 0.014,   d = 2.03 ). A repeated measures ANOVA, with session (1 – 359 
3) as a within-subjects factor and arms configuration (straight or crossed) as a between-subjects factor 360 
found no main effect of session (F(2,16) = 1.869, P = 0.186, partial η2 = 0.108), suggesting that subjects 361 
did not learn to solve the task over the course of the experiment (see also Fig. S1b in Online Resource 4). 362 
There was also no effect of arms configuration (F(1,8) = 0.055, P = 0.820, partial η2 = 0.021), suggesting 363 
that subjects were equally able to solve the task whether the experimenter’s arms were straight or crossed. 364 
There was no interaction between session and arms configuration (F(2,16) = 0.486, P = 0.624, partial η2 365 
= 0.052). 366 
In Trial 1 of the experiment, only 5/10 subjects (50.0%) selected the hand containing the item 367 
from Jar A (binomial test: P = 1.00). However, pooling Trial 1 performance for each subject across the 368 
three sessions of Experiment 2 to increase power revealed performance that was significantly better than 369 
chance (mean = 2.1 trials correct out of 3; one-sample t-test: t(9) = 3.343, P = 0.009,   d = 2.229).  370 
While the results of Experiment 2 suggest that capuchins may be capable of rudimentary 371 
probabilistic reasoning, probability and quantity were confounded in this experiment, because more 372 
numerous also meant more probable (Denison and Xu 2014). Given that previous work has shown that 373 
capuchins are capable of comparing quantities of items and selecting the larger of the two (e.g. Addessi et 374 
al. 2008; Evans et al. 2009; VanMarle et al. 2006) it is possible that subjects succeeded by using a 375 
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quantity heuristic such as “select the sample from the jar containing the most peanuts” without 376 
considering the proportions in each jar. Therefore, the findings from Experiment 2 replicate results in the 377 
animal numerical reasoning literature and extend it, as the monkeys were asked to indicate one of two 378 
hidden samples, rather than choose between the distributions themselves, suggesting some understanding 379 
of sampling and not straightforward numerical comparison. Returning to the question of heuristics, the 380 
aim of Experiment 3 was to directly address this possibility. 381 
Experiment 3: Ruling out a choice heuristic based on absolute quantity of preferred items 382 
In this experiment, we pitted absolute quantity of preferred items against probability. If subjects 383 
base their selection on the sample from the jar containing the larger absolute quantity of peanuts rather 384 
than reasoning about relative proportions, then they should select the sample from Jar B more often than 385 
expected by chance. 386 
Subjects 387 
 Fifteen subjects participated in Experiment 3 (see Table 1). The other four subjects did not 388 
participate due to a lack of motivation to participate in sufficient sessions to complete the experiment.  389 
Apparatus and procedure 390 
The jars depicted in Figure 1c were used. Jar A contained 32 peanuts and 8 pellets (4:1), and Jar 391 
B contained 60 peanuts and 240 pellets (1:4). As in Experiment 2, the samples always consisted of a 392 
peanut from Jar A and a pellet from Jar B. Items were presented to the subject in closed fists and once 393 
they had taken the selected item the alternative item was revealed to them (see video in Online Resource 394 
7). There were three sessions of six trials (18 trials in total). 395 
Results and discussion 396 
Of the fifteen subjects that participated in Experiment 3, four exhibited a constant side bias) and 397 
so were excluded from our analyses. The eleven subjects that were not 100% side-biased selected the 398 
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hand containing the item from Jar A (peanut:pellet ratio of 32:8) in 67.7% trials correct (t(10) = 3.791, P 399 
= 0.004,  d = 2.40). A repeated measures ANOVA, with session (1 – 3) as a within-subjects factor and 400 
arms configuration (straight or crossed) as a between-subjects factor found no main effect of session 401 
(F(2,18) = 0.10, P = 0.990, partial η2 = 0.001), suggesting that subjects did not learn to solve the task over 402 
the course of the experiment (see also Fig. S1c in Online Resource 4). There was also no effect of arms 403 
configuration (F(1,9) = 0.003, P = 0.955, partial η2 = 0.000), suggesting that subjects were equally able to 404 
solve the task whether the experimenter’s arms were straight or crossed. There was no interaction 405 
between session and arms configuration (F(2,9) = 1.573, P = 0.241, partial η2 = 0.149). 406 
In Trial 1 of Experiment 3, 7/11 subjects (63.6%) selected the hand containing the item from Jar 407 
A (binomial test: P = 0.549). Pooling Trial 1 performance for each subject across the three sessions of 408 
Experiment 3 to increase power revealed performance that was significantly better than chance (mean = 409 
2.0 trials correct out of 3; one-sample t-test: t(10) = 2.622, P = 0.026,  d = 1.658).     410 
The results of Experiment 3 further support the idea that capuchins are capable of rudimentary 411 
probabilistic reasoning, as they were able to make accurate inferences about samples drawn from 412 
populations that were not based on the absolute quantity of preferred items, as has been demonstrated 413 
with infants (Denison and Xu 2014) and apes (Rakoczy et al. 2014). However, there are two additional 414 
heuristics that capuchins could still potentially have used to make decisions in Experiments 2 and 3, and 415 
which infants and apes could have used in previous studies, which are impossible to tease apart from 416 
probabilistic inference given the distributions used in those experiments. First, the possibility remains that 417 
capuchins could have succeeded in both experiments by avoiding the sample from the jar containing the 418 
larger absolute quantity of non-preferred items; e.g. by using a heuristic such as “select the sample from 419 
the jar containing the fewest pellets”; a possibility previous work with other species does not address, 420 
though Rakoczy and colleagues (2014) do discuss it. This alternative would allow them to avoid 421 
comparing the ratio of peanuts to pellets in Jar A to the ratio of peanuts to pellets in Jar B, and allow 422 
them instead to compare the absolute quantities of pellets across jars. Alternatively, subjects could have 423 
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used a different heuristic, one slightly more complex than the avoidance strategy but still a shortcut to 424 
engaging in true comparison of proportions. In both Experiments 2 and 3, capuchins were faced with a 425 
decision between a sample drawn from a jar containing a larger quantity of peanuts than pellets versus a 426 
sample from a jar containing a larger quantity of pellets than peanuts. They could avoid comparing the 427 
ratios in each jar to one another by simply marking any jar that has a larger number of peanuts than pellets 428 
a “good” jar, and any jar that has a larger number of pellets than peanuts a “bad” jar. In this case, 429 
comparison of ratios across jars is unnecessary, as subjects can simply select the sample drawn from the 430 
good jar (or avoid the sample from the bad jar) rather than compare ratios (Denison and Xu 2014). We 431 
address both of these potential heuristics in Experiment 4. Jar A contained 100 peanuts and 200 pellets 432 
and Jar B contained 22 peanuts and 200 pellets. This addresses the first heuristic based on avoiding 433 
pellets, as the jars have equal absolute quantities of pellets. Thus if capuchins use absolute quantity 434 
estimations to avoid pellets, they will perform at chance. It addresses the second heuristic because, if a 435 
subject were simply labelling jars as “good” or “bad”, he would have to label both of these jars as “bad”, 436 
as they both contain more pellets than peanuts, and they would not know which sample to select, again 437 
performing at chance. If they instead can compare the ratios of peanuts to pellets, then they should be 438 
more likely to select the sample from Jar A. Experiment 4 thus represents a particularly challenging case 439 
that no species, including human infants, has yet been shown to solve. 440 
Experiment 4: Ruling out a choice heuristic based on avoiding the larger absolute quantity 441 
of non-preferred items, or labelling jars as “good” and “bad” 442 
Experiment 4 was a novel experimental condition that infants and apes have not previously been 443 
tested on, which aimed to investigate, for the first time, whether individuals might potentially be using an 444 
alternative heuristic (as opposed to choosing on the basis of the greater quantity of preferred items, which 445 
has been ruled out by Experiment 3) when solving this type of task. In this experiment we kept the 446 
absolute quantity of non-preferred items the same in both jars, and also in the majority, so both jars would 447 
be “bad” jars. Therefore, if subjects were basing their selection on avoiding the jar containing the greater 448 
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absolute quantity of non-preferred items, or were simply labelling jars as “bad” and avoiding them, they 449 
would be expected to perform at chance-level (50% of trials correct). 450 
Subjects 451 
Sixteen subjects participated in Experiment 4 (see Table 1). The remaining three subjects did not 452 
participate due to a lack of motivation to participate in sufficient sessions to complete the experiment.  453 
Apparatus and procedure 454 
The jars depicted in Figure 1d were used. Jar A contained 100 peanuts and 200 pellets, and Jar B 455 
contained 22 peanuts and 200 pellets. Unlike in Experiments 1 – 3 where Jar A always contained a greater 456 
quantity of peanuts than pellets whereas the reverse was true for Jar B, in Experiment 4 both jars 457 
contained a greater quantity of pellets than peanuts. Therefore, we chose to manipulate the sample drawn 458 
from Jar A so that unlike in Experiments 1 – 3 it did not consist of a peanut in every trial; instead a peanut 459 
was drawn from Jar A in 2/6 trials, and a pellet in the remaining 4/6 trials (to match the probability of the 460 
population). The order in which the different items were drawn out of Jar A for the different sessions was 461 
the same for each monkey and as follows: session 1: pellet, peanut, pellet, pellet, peanut, pellet; session 2: 462 
peanut, pellet, pellet, peanut, pellet, pellet; session 3: pellet, pellet, peanut, pellet, pellet, peanut. A pellet 463 
(the majority item) was always drawn out of Jar B. Items were presented to the subject in closed fists and 464 
once they had taken the selected item the alternative item was revealed to them (see video in Online 465 
Resource 8). There were three sessions of six trials (18 trials in total). 466 
Results and discussion 467 
Of the sixteen subjects that participated in Experiment 4, seven exhibited a constant side bias and 468 
so were excluded from our analyses. The nine subjects that were not 100% side-biased selected the hand 469 
containing the item from Jar A (peanut:pellet ratio of 100:200) in 58.0% of trials (Figure 3), and while 470 
performance was in the same direction as the other experiments, it was only marginally significant (one-471 
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sample t-test: (t(8) = 2.163, P = 0.063,  d = 1.53). A repeated measures ANOVA (corrected using 472 
Greenhouse-Geisser estimates of sphericity), with session (1 – 3) as a within-subjects factor and arms 473 
configuration (straight or crossed) as a between-subjects factor found no main effect of session 474 
(F(1.123,7.862) = 0.758, P = 0.425, partial η2 = 0.098), suggesting that subjects did not learn to solve the 475 
task over the course of the experiment (see also Fig. S1d in Online Resource 4). There was also no effect 476 
of arms configuration (F(1,7) = 0.012, P = 0.916, partial η2 = 0.002), suggesting that subjects were 477 
equally able to solve the task whether the experimenter’s arms were straight or crossed. There was no 478 
interaction between session and arms configuration (F(1.123,7.862) = 0.408, P = 0.645, partial η2 = 479 
0.055). 480 
In Trial 1 of Experiment 4, 3/9 subjects (33.3%) selected the hand containing the item from Jar A 481 
(binomial test: P = 0.508). Pooling Trial 1 performance for each subject across the three sessions of 482 
Experiment 4 to increase power revealed performance that did not differ significantly from chance (mean 483 
= 1.67 trials correct out of 3; one-sample t-test: t(8) = 0.577, P = 0.580,  d = 0.408).    484 
Although capuchins’ performance in Experiment 4 was only marginally above chance and Trial 1 485 
performance did not differ from chance, additional factors unrelated to probabilistic reasoning may have 486 
contributed to making the task presented in Experiment 4 more challenging than Experiments 1 – 3. First, 487 
the populations in Jar A and B were more difficult to discriminate visually than in the other experiments 488 
since both contained a majority of pellets (see Online Resource 10). Second, the reward schedule 489 
implemented differed from that used in the other experiments (as described in the Apparatus and 490 
Procedure section for Experiment 4). In Experiments 1 – 3 the sample always consisted of the more 491 
probable item from each jar (as in Rakoczy et al. 2014), which in each case was a peanut from Jar A and a 492 
pellet from Jar B. Therefore subjects were always rewarded for selecting the hand containing the sample 493 
from the “correct” jar. In Experiment 4 however, because the most probable item from each jar would 494 
have been a pellet on every trial, we manipulated the sample drawn from Jar A to match the probability of 495 
the population, such that it consisted of a peanut in 2/6 trials. This reward schedule would be less likely to 496 
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result in reinforcement-based learning, and may have led to reduced motivation. However, Trial 1 497 
performance in Experiment 4 (33.3% correct) was also lower in this experiment than overall performance, 498 
and lower than Trial 1 performance in Experiments 1 – 3, which cannot be explained by the different 499 
reinforcement schedule. 500 
General discussion 501 
The results of these experiments suggest that some capuchin monkeys, like human infants 502 
(Denison and Xu 2010; 2014) and great apes (Rakoczy et al. 2014), are capable of making probabilistic 503 
inferences from populations to samples, and success was not due to learning across trials. In particular, 504 
Experiment 3 ruled out the possibility that capuchins succeeded by using a heuristic based on comparing 505 
absolute quantities of preferred items in the two populations
2
, though relatively poor performance in 506 
Experiment 4 suggests that capuchins (and possibly infants and apes) may rely on quantity-based 507 
heuristics in certain situations. Our experiments show that at minimum capuchins do not solve these tasks 508 
by using one simple heuristic that even school-aged children have been shown to rely on in some more 509 
explicit probabilistic inference tasks (Falk et al., 2012): selecting the item from the population containing 510 
the greatest absolute quantity of preferred items. The possibility remains that individuals of any of the 511 
taxa tested to date could be flexibly using a combination of different heuristics in different tasks (e.g. in 512 
our study “select sample from population with greatest absolute quantity of peanuts” in Experiments 2 513 
and 4, and “avoid sample from population with greatest absolute quantity of pellets” in Experiment 3). 514 
However, we believe that probabilistic inference is a more parsimonious explanation for our data. Taken 515 
together, our results provide some evidence to suggest that the capacity for rudimentary intuitive statistics 516 
may be evolutionarily ancient, given that humans and capuchins shared a common ancestor over 30 517 
                                                          
2
 It should be noted that it is not possible to say how capuchins were estimating proportions, i.e. whether they 
computed probabilities over numerical representations or continuous quantities, and this question has not yet been 
examined in either infants or apes. While this is an interesting avenue for future research, computing proportions is 
about considering relative amounts, regardless of format.  
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million years ago (Fragaszy, 2004; though it is also possible that this capacity evolved convergently in 518 
capuchins and apes, Reader et al. 2011).  519 
Despite some methodological differences between species (e.g. number of subjects, number of 520 
trials, exact quantities of items in populations) it is possible to draw meaningful comparisons between the 521 
results of the current capuchin study and previous data from infants and apes. Infants, apes and capuchins 522 
were all presented with a task where the total number of items in the two populations was the same, but 523 
the proportions of preferred to non-preferred items were reversed (4:1 vs. 1:4 for all three species; total 524 
number of items in the populations varied between species). Infants were only presented with a single 525 
trial (Denison and Xu 2010); therefore their performance can be compared with Trial 1 performance for 526 
apes and capuchins. Because side-bias data were not available for the previous ape study, here we discuss 527 
our own data with all capuchins included, to facilitate valid comparison. Twenty-five out of 32 infants 528 
(78%) succeeded in their single trial (Denison and Xu 2010), compared with correct Trial 1 performance 529 
by 20/28 apes (71%; Rakoczy et al. 2014: Experiment 1). In our study (Experiment 2), 10/17 capuchins 530 
(59%) chose correctly in Trial 1, with 7 of those individuals subsequently exhibiting a 100% side-bias (5 531 
who chose correctly and 2 incorrectly in Trial 1). Pooling data for all trials, both capuchins and great apes 532 
performed above chance-level, though capuchins succeeded in fewer trials (58% correct with completely 533 
side-biased individuals’ data included; Experiment 2 of this study), than apes (71% correct; Rakoczy et al. 534 
2014: Experiment 1).  535 
All three species were also presented with a task in which absolute quantity was pitted against 536 
probability (as in Experiment 3 of this study); such that the population that was more likely to produce a 537 
preferred-item sample contained the smaller absolute quantity of preferred items (though again total 538 
numbers of items in the populations varied between species). Nineteen out of 24 infants (79%) succeeded 539 
in their single trial (Denison and Xu 2014: Experiment 2), compared with correct Trial 1 performance by 540 
20/26 apes (77%, Rakoczy et al. 2014). In our Experiment 3, 9/15 capuchins chose correctly in Trial 1, 541 
with 4 of these individuals (2 that chose correctly and 2 incorrectly) subsequently exhibiting a 100% side-542 
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bias. Across all trials, apes succeeded in 63% (Rakoczy et al. 2014: Experiment 6), which was the same as 543 
capuchins’ success rate (63% of trials correct with completely side-biased individuals’ data included; 544 
Experiment 3 of this study), providing evidence of an ability to reason about relative frequencies of 545 
preferred and non-preferred items within populations and to draw inferences about random single-item 546 
samples drawn from these populations. 547 
In our Experiment 4, which was a novel condition unexamined in previous work done with 548 
infants and apes, capuchins were presented with a task in which the total number of non-preferred items 549 
was held constant in the two populations, and also outnumbered the preferred items in both jars (i.e. both 550 
jars were unlikely to yield a preferred item, but one was more unlikely than the other). This meant that 551 
subjects could not succeed by avoiding the sample drawn from the population containing the greater 552 
quantity of non-preferred items, or by marking one Jar As “bad” and one Jar As “good”. Capuchins’ 553 
performance was marginally different from chance across all trials (58% of trials correct overall). Trial 1 554 
performance did not differ from chance (3/9 subjects, 33%, correct), even when Trial 1 of each session 555 
was pooled to increase power (56% of first trials correct). Apes were not tested in a task where the 556 
quantity of non-preferred items was equal in the two populations (Rakoczy et al. 2014) and infant 557 
performance was only marginally significant in an analogous task in which both populations were likely 558 
to yield a preferred object but one was more likely (Denison and Xu 2014: Experiment 4), which suggests 559 
that there may be something more difficult about this task. One possibility (in addition to the different 560 
reinforcement schedule mentioned in the Experiment 4 Results and Discussion section) is that the ratio 561 
between ratios (defined as the ratio of preferred to non-preferred items in the favourable population, 562 
divided by the ratio of preferred to non-preferred items in the unfavourable population; Drucker et al. 563 
2016) of the populations in Experiment 4 ((100/200) / (22/200) = 4.55) was lower than in Experiment 2 564 
((240/60) / (60/240) = 16) and Experiment 3 ((32/8) / (60/240) = 16). Drucker et al. (2016) found that 565 
macaques were better able to select the “favourable” of two arrays (greater ratio of positive to negative 566 
stimuli) on a touchscreen when the ratio between ratios was higher. It also leaves open the possibility that 567 
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at least some subjects may have used a strategy that involved avoiding the population containing the 568 
greatest absolute quantity of non-preferred items (not possible in Experiment 4 as both populations 569 
contain the same number of non-preferred items), or by marking each Jar As “good” or “bad” (both jars 570 
would be “bad” in this task).  571 
A critic could argue that capuchins solved the tasks presented in our study due to a “Clever Hans” 572 
effect; that is, by using subtle behavioural cues from the human experimenter. However, we think this is 573 
unlikely for the following reasons. First, Rakoczy et al. (2014) demonstrated that apes still solved this 574 
type of task when Clever Hans effects were controlled for in an intricately designed experiment involving 575 
two experimenters and special equipment (which we were unfortunately unable to replicate due to testing 576 
setup constraints), and their performance did not differ from the original experiment without the Clever 577 
Hans controls. Second, non-human primates are notoriously poor at understanding even deliberate human 578 
communicative cues such as pointing (e.g. Bräuer et al. 2006; but see e.g. Hopkins et al. 2013 for 579 
evidence that chimpanzees can utilise human pointing as a cue in a modified object-choice task), and 580 
capuchins specifically were found to be unable to use experimenter gaze direction to locate a food reward 581 
hidden under one of two objects, even after receiving 510 trials (Anderson et al. 1995). Finally, as 582 
described in the Methods section the experimenter was aware of the potential for unintentional cueing and 583 
implemented several measures to control for this possibility. 584 
It could also be argued that capuchins solved the tasks by using olfactory cues from the items 585 
concealed in the experimenter’s hands; however we also think this is unlikely. Capuchins rely on visual 586 
information more than olfactory cues to locate food (Fragaszy et al. 2004), and free-ranging capuchins did 587 
not succeed in using olfactory cues to locate food concealed in containers (Bolen and Green 1997). Our 588 
experimental set-up also made it difficult for capuchins to exploit olfactory cues. The cubicle doors were 589 
polycarbonate windows with small arm holes (as opposed to more open wire mesh), and at the time of 590 
choice the samples were held at such a distance that the capuchins had to fully extend an arm out of the 591 
window to reach one of the experimenter’s hands (see videos in Online Resources 2, 5, 7 and 8) meaning 592 
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that it was not possible to sniff the samples directly, making the detection of odour cues was unlikely. 593 
Additionally, the latex gloves worn by the experimenter at all times had a strong odour, and all testing 594 
sessions started with the test individual being handed both sunflower seeds and raisins, adding further 595 
scents to the experimenter’s gloved hands.  596 
As mentioned earlier (see Experiment 1 Results and Discussion), capuchins performed more 597 
poorly than we expected in the baseline condition, which did not require subjects to reason 598 
probabilistically. Any factors limiting performance in Experiment 1 would also apply to Experiments 2 – 599 
4 where subjects were additionally required to reason about proportions, and therefore could also have 600 
been responsible for limiting performance in these test conditions. Is there any evidence that apes perform 601 
better in tasks designed to test object permanence, short-term memory or inhibitory control that might 602 
explain capuchins’ relatively lower success rate in some of the sampling tasks?  603 
Amici and colleagues (2008, 2010) compared the performance of several ape and monkey species 604 
in a battery of physical cognition and inhibitory control tasks. Chimpanzees and bonobos outperformed 605 
capuchins in a short-term memory task (though capuchins still performed above chance-level), and 606 
capuchins were outperformed by chimpanzees, bonobos and gorillas in a single invisible displacement 607 
task (Amici et al. 2010). Similarly, capuchins performed significantly worse than chimpanzees and 608 
bonobos in a series of inhibitory control tasks (Amici et al. 2008; but see MacLean et al. 2014 for 609 
evidence of capuchins performing comparably to great apes in two inhibitory control tasks).  610 
Interestingly, Girotto et al. (2016) recently presented 3-year-old children with a task comparable 611 
to our Experiment 1, where one population consisted of 100% of one type of item, and the second 612 
population consisted of 100% of another type of item. Children were presented with a single trial, and 613 
unlike for our capuchins, the samples were never crossed over (so the task was arguably more 614 
straightforward). In one of these tasks (Study 2, Task A; the one that was most similar to our Experiment 615 
1), only 33 out of 48 3-year-olds selected the sample drawn from the favourable population (69% correct), 616 
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compared with capuchins’ Trial 1 performance of 16/19 (84%) correct. This finding suggests that making 617 
inferences from homogeneous populations to samples can be a non-trivial task, even for 3-year-old 618 
children, and the authors posit that this may be due to inhibitory control limitations resulting in a working 619 
memory overload (Girotto et al. 2016).  620 
The presence of significant side-biases throughout this study, and evidence from comparative 621 
studies that apes outperform capuchins in tasks that rely on abilities related to our choice-based dependent 622 
variable (e.g. object permanence, short-term memory and inhibitory control; Amici et al. 2008; 2010) 623 
suggest that it was not having to reason about probabilities that was more challenging for the capuchins 624 
than the infants and apes previously tested using this paradigm. This is further supported by the fact that 625 
capuchins’ performance in Experiments 2 and 3 of this study did not differ from their performance in 626 
Experiment 1 (baseline condition), which did not involve probabilistic reasoning. One way to investigate 627 
this further would be to test capuchins on looking-time versions of our experiments. If capuchins 628 
performed better in this version than in our current action-based version (i.e. they reliably looked longer 629 
at unlikely samples) then this would bolster the claim that it is these other aspects of the task, not 630 
reasoning about probabilities, that limits capuchins’ performance.  631 
In conclusion, we found evidence that at least some capuchins, like human infants and apes, were 632 
able to make inferences about single-item samples randomly drawn from heterogeneous populations 633 
(Experiment 2), and this was achieved by reasoning about relative as opposed to absolute frequencies of 634 
preferred and non-preferred items within populations (Experiment 3). This is the first evidence for 635 
intuitive probabilistic inference in a monkey species, suggesting that the ability to reason about 636 
probabilities may be evolutionarily ancient. However, given that sophisticated cognitive abilities may 637 
have evolved convergently in capuchins and great apes (Reader et al. 2011), additional primate species 638 
would need to be tested to establish just how widespread the capacity for probabilistic inference is. As 639 
performance was relatively poor in Experiment 4 – our novel experimental condition that goes beyond the 640 
work previously done with either apes or infants – further research is required to establish whether some 641 
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capuchins might use strategies that involve avoiding non-preferred items or marking the populations as 642 
“good” and “bad”; and whether the same might be true for apes and/or infants. Given the broad ecological 643 
relevance of reasoning about proportions, future research should also aim to investigate whether 644 
probabilistic inference is an ability that is also shared with non-primate species.  645 
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Table 1 Details of capuchins that participated in this study. All individuals were born in captivity and mother-750 
reared, except for Kato who was wild-born and hand-reared. Group refers to the geographical location of the 751 
enclosures at the zoo and age is in years 752 
Name Group Sex Age 
Experiment 
participation 
Alba West F 2 1,2,3,4 
Anita East F 16 1,2,3,4 
Carlos East M 8 1,2,3,4 
Chico East M 4 1,2,3,4 
Diego West M 11 1,2,3,4 
Figo West M 7 1,2,3,4 
Flojo East M 2 1,2,3,4 
Inti West M 4 1,2,3,4 
Junon East F 13 1,2,3,4 
Kato East M 8 1,2,3,4 
Luna West F 2 1,2,3,4 
Manuel East M 8 1,2 
Pedra West F 5 1 
Reuben East M 3 1,2,3,4 
Rufo West M 4 1,2,3,4 
Sylvie West F 10 1,2,4 
Toka West M 9 1 
Torres West M 2 1,2,3,4 
Ximo West M 3 1,2,3,4 
  753 
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 756 
Figure 1 Schematic representations of the distributions of populations in Jar A (left in each pair) and Jar B (right in 757 
each pair) for Experiments 1 – 4 (jar placement was counterbalanced on the left and right in all experiments). Light 758 
grey circles represent peanuts (preferred food item) and dark grey circles represent monkey pellets (non-preferred 759 
food item). Ratios underneath the jars represent the peanut:pellet ratio in that jar. All jars were transparent so the 760 
populations were continuously visible to the monkeys 761 
  762 
  300:0      0:300      240:60     60:240          32:8       60:240          100:200   22:200 
(A) Experiment 1    (B) Experiment 2        (C) Experiment 3          (D) Experiment 4 
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 763 
   764 
Figure 2 Schematic representation of the experimental setup and general procedure. Subjects participated 765 
individually in a test cubicle (see Leonardi et al. 2010 for full details of the cubicle set up) with a custom-made 766 
Plexiglas window. At the start of each trial the experimenter simultaneously shook both jars whilst looking at the 767 
subject to draw their attention. She then randomly drew a single item from each jar simultaneously, and kept them 768 
hidden from the subject in her closed fists. The experimenter then extended her arms to present her closed fists 769 
containing the concealed items at the two holes in the cubicle window, either keeping her arms straight (a) or 770 
crossing them over (b). In Experiment 1, the experimenter’s arms were straight for the first three sessions of trials 771 
and crossed for the fourth session. For each of Experiments 2 – 4 subjects were pseudorandomly assigned to either 772 
arms straight or arms crossed presentation, with the constraint that across these three experiments subjects either had 773 
arms straight in 2/3 experiments and arms crossed in 1/3, or vice-versa 774 
  775 
  (a) arms straight       (b) arms crossed 
    36 
PROBABILISTIC INFERENCE IN CAPUCHINS 
 776 
 777 
Figure 3 Mean proportion of trials (± 1 standard error) in which subjects selected the hand containing the item from 778 
Jar A in Experiments 1 – 4. Experiment 1 had 24 trials and Experiments 2 – 4 each had 18 trials. All subjects 779 
completed Experiment 1 first; the order in which subjects subsequently completed Experiments 2 – 4 was 780 
randomised. ** indicates P < 0.01, * indicates P < 0.05, and + indicates P < 0.07 in a one-sample t-test. Dashed line 781 
indicates chance-level performance (half of the trials correct). This graph excludes individuals with a 100% side bias 782 
in a given experiment 783 
**  *       **       
+ 
